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Abstract. Current safety standards for automated driving recommend the devel-
opment of a safety case. This case aims to justify and critically evaluate, by means 
of an explicit argument and evidence, how the safety claims concerning the in-
tended functionality of an automated driving feature are supported. However, lit-
tle guidance exists on how such an argument could be developed. In this paper, 
the MISRA consortium proposes a state machine on which an argument concern-
ing the safety of the intended functionality could be structured. By systematically 
covering the activation status of the automated driving feature within and outside 
the operational design domain, this state machine helps in exploring the condi-
tions, and asserting the corresponding safety claims, under which hazardous 
events could be caused by the intended functionality. MISRA uses a Traffic Jam 
Drive feature to illustrate the application of this approach. 
Keywords: Safety Assurance, Safety Case, SOTIF, ODD, Automated Driving. 
1 Problem 
1.1 Safety Assurance of Automated Driving 
Automated Driving (AD) promises to revolutionize the future of road transportation. 
However, the challenge of assuring its safety is significant and is subject to ongoing 
discussion and research. There are a variety of emerging standards such as 
ISO/PAS 21448 [1], UL 4600 [2] and ISO/TR 4804 [3] that relate to the safety of AD. 
These standards leave freedom for developers to reason about the safety of their sys-
tems by calling for the achievement of high-level goals or objectives, rather than con-
formance to prescriptive requirements, and by avoiding a declaration of what level of 
residual risk is reasonable or otherwise.  
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It is therefore not considered appropriate, nor feasible, to attempt to generate a com-
SOLDQFHDUJXPHQWRIWKHIRUP³7KH$utomated Driving System (ADS) is safe because 
LWVGHYHORSPHQWFRPSOLHVZLWKWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIVWDQGDUG;´ Instead there is a pro-
fessional responsibility placed on engineers to creatively justify, based on clear and 
rigorous evidence, why they believe their ADS is free from unreasonable risk. It is 
proposed that this justification should be communicated in the form of a safety argu-
ment, as part of a safety case [4], that will feature claims, assumptions and evidence 
related to a variety of standards, as acknowledged in [2]. This will help to ensure greater 
transparency in the development of ADS by enabling safety assessors and other stake-
holders to critically evaluate the basis on which the system might be deployed.  
 
1.2 Role of the Operational Design Domain  
It is often the case that the Intended Functionality (IF), [1], of the ADS can only be 
achieved for a restricted set of vehicle, and external environmental, conditions referred 
WRDVWKH2SHUDWLRQDO'HVLJQ'RPDLQ2''>@DQGGHILQHGDVWKH³2SHUDWLQJFon-
ditions under which a given driving automation system or feature thereof is specifically 
GHVLJQHGWRIXQFWLRQ«´>@7KLVOLPLWDWLRQPD\DULVHIURPNQRZQSHUIRUPDQFHOLP
itations or specification inefficiencies. To justify that the ADS is free from unreasona-
ble risk it is necessary to reason about its IF when the vehicle is within the ODD, but 
also when the vehicle is transitioning into and out of the ODD.  
The aim of this paper is to propose an approach to assuring ADS safety, initially 
aligned to ISO/PAS 21448, which is based on the central role played by the ODD and 
its transitions. It is illustrated with some example safety assurance considerations for a 
generic ³7UDIILF-DP'ULYH´TJD) feature. 
2 Proposed Approach 
2.1 ODD Transitions in an Example TJD Drive Cycle 
Consider a typical drive cycle in which the generic TJD feature described in [7] may 
be used: 
x The driver starts their journey by initializing the vehicle outside of the ODD 
before driving it into the ODD (e.g. onto a highway in clear weather with a 
lead vehicle etc.); 
x TJD availability is indicated to the driver and the driver chooses to enable the 
feature, handing responsibility for the Dynamic Driving Task (DDT) [6] to the 
TJD feature;  
x The TJD feature continues to control the DDT until either: 
o The driver chooses to deactivate the feature and resume control, or 
o The TJD hands control back to the driver without driver request;  
x The driver leaves the highway (exiting the ODD), completes their journey and 
parks and secures the vehicle. 
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If the TJD feature were to be activated before entry to the ODD, or if the vehicle were 
to leave the ODD with the TJD still in control, the TJD feature would be responsible 
for controlling the DDT under conditions for which it was not designed. However, un-
less the driver is ready to resume control it may be unsafe for the TJD feature to relin-
quish DDT responsibility on exiting the ODD.  
 
2.2 Presence of the Vehicle in the ODD and Activation Status of the Intended 
Functionality 
The two key parameters identified in the above drive cycle, whose combination is crit-
ical for considering safe control of the DDT, are: 
 
1. The presence of the vehicle in the ODD, or otherwise; 
2. The activation status of the (TJD) feature. 
 
MISRA expresses the combination of these parameters in the form of a state termed the 
³2''-$FWLYDWLRQ6WDWH´ which can take one of four values: 
 
x State 1 - IF is active whilst the vehicle is within the ODD 
x State 2 - IF is active whilst the vehicle is outside of the ODD 
x State 3 - IF is inactive whilst the vehicle is within the ODD 
x State 4 - IF is inactive whilst the vehicle is outside of the ODD 
 
These states and the possible transitions between them are depicted as a state machine 
in Figure 1. It might be argued that transitions could occur directly between State 1 and 
State 4 and also between State 2 and State 3. This would require the IF activation status 
to change at exactly the same time as the vehicle presence in the ODD changes. In 
practice this is very unlikely to occur, although it is recognized that the time spent in 
some of the states could be very short. 
 
 
Fig. 1. ODD-Activation States and transitions 
State1:
Active & Within ODD
State2:
Active & Outside ODD
State3:
Inactive & Within ODD
State4:
Inactive & Outside ODD
T 1-2
T 2-1
T 1-3T 3-1
T 3-4
T 4-3
T 4-2 T 2-4
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2.3 Example TJD Safety Claims 
By explicitly defining the states and transitions in Figure 1 the corresponding safety 
implications and possible safety claims can be systematically identified. Let us illus-
trate this by returning to the TJD drive cycle example. Using the ODD-Activation state 
machine (Figure 1), Table 1 expands the steps previously outlined with some example 
informal claims that one may wish to make about the corresponding ADS behaviour. 
Table 1. Example TJD ODD-Activation States and transitions and corresponding safety claims 
ODD-
Activation 
State or 
Transition 
TJD Drive Cycle Step Example Informal Safety Claims 
State 4 
Driver initialises vehicle outside 
of the ODD as the vehicle has 
not yet entered a highway with a 
lead vehicle, even though visi-
bility is good. 
The TJD feature will detect when the vehicle is out-
side of the ODD. 
 
Activation of the TJD is prevented until the vehicle 
enters the ODD. 
T 4-3 
Vehicle enters the highway be-
hind a lead vehicle. Visibility re-
mains good and so the vehicle 
has entered the ODD. The driver 
is still in control of the DDT. 
- 
T 3-1 
TJD availability is indicated to 
the driver and the driver chooses 
to activate the feature, handing 
across control of the DDT. 
The handover of DDT control to the TJD is as antici-
pated by the driver - it is intuitive and predictable and 
does not occur unless it is requested by the driver who 
is ready for it. 
State 1 The TJD feature continues to 
control the DDT until... 
The TJD controls the DDT within the ODD in a safe 
manner (e.g. successfully performing Object and 
Event Detection and Response (OEDR) [6] by keep-
ing the vehicle in lane and at a safe distance to the 
lead vehicle, avoiding obstacle collision etc.) 
T 1-3 
...the driver chooses to deacti-
vate the feature, taking back 
control of the DDT ... 
The hand-back of control to the driver by the TJD is 
as anticipated by the driver - it is intuitive and predict-
able and does not occur until the driver is ready for it. 
T 1-2 
 
State 2 
 
T 2-4 
...or the TJD hands DDT control 
back to the driver because, for 
example, visibility suddenly 
drops due to a change in the 
weather.  
 
Note: this would ultimately 
cause entry into State 4, via 
State 2. 
The TJD will never cause exit from the ODD, e.g. by 
causing the vehicle to leave the highway. 
 
The TJD will detect the vehicle leaving the ODD (e.g. 
due to a sudden change of weather conditions, outside 
of its control) in a timely manner 
 
If the vehicle leaves the ODD whilst the TJD is in 
control of the DDT the TJD feature will take an ap-
propriate and timely safe action, such as handing back 
control of the DDT to an alert driver or reaching a 
Minimal Risk Condition (MRC) [6]. 
 
The TJD feature will not regularly have to hand-back 
control of the DDT to the driver because of the inabil-
ity of the feature to cope with commonly occurring, 
predictable, conditions (such as a change in weather 
conditions). 
State 4 
The driver completes the drive 
cycle, bringing the vehicle to 
rest and powering it down 
- 
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2.4 MISRA SOTIF Argument Structure 
From the example claims in Table 1, and by considering the states and transitions in 
Figure 1, we can extract some general high-level claims that one may wish to make 
about any ADS. These have been collated in a single argument structure expressed in 
Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [8], the top level of which is shown in Figure 2.  
For completeness, the argument structure incorporates reference to the consideration 
of post-release SOTIF issues. Whilst this is an important topic it is not one considered 
to be central to the ideas presented in this paper and is thus not explored further. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Top-level SOTIF safety argument 
3 Discussion and Further Work 
The four-state model and corresponding safety argument represents MISRA¶s initial 
insight into an approach that highlights the central role played by the ODD in assuring 
ADS safety. The argument in Figure 2 represents an initial structure for a series of 
subsequent claims and items of evidence that will relate to a variety of topics in [1]. It 
Intended 
Functionality
{Functional and 
System Specification}
Achievement of SOTIF
The absence of Unreasonable Risk due 
to Hazardous Events associated with the 
Intended Functionality (IF) of the {Item} or 
its reasonably foreseeable misuse is 
achieved
Hazardous Events
{Hazardous Events 
1...n)
Unreasonable Risk
{Unreasonable Risk 
Criteria}
Item
{The implemented 
HW, SW, Data, etc.}
ODD-Activation States
Argument structured by 
the ODD-Activation States 
and the transitions 
between them
ODD-Activation States 
and Transitions
States and transitions 
as defined in Figure 1
State 2 Hazardous Events
No hazardous events caused by 
the IF within State 2, or when 
transitioning from it, present 
unreasonable risk
State 1 Hazardous Events
No hazardous events caused by 
the IF within State 1, or when 
transitioning from it, present 
unreasonable risk
State 3 Hazardous Events
No hazardous events caused by 
the IF when transitioning from 
State 3 present unreasonable 
risk
State 4 Hazardous Events
No hazardous events caused by 
the IF when transitioning from 
State 4 present unreasonable 
risk
Pre-Release
The IF is free from 
unreasonable risk when first 
introduced into the field
Pre and Post-Release
Argue over development of 
the IF and its operation in 
the field
Post-Release
Due consideration has been 
given to addressing the risk 
associated with post-release 
SOTIF issues
6 
is anticipated that these claims will be categorized according to the following MISRA 
argument themes related to those introduced in [9]: 
 
x The rationale for the SOTIF requirements used to specify the IF; 
x The satisfaction of these requirements by the implemented IF; 
x The means used to perform the various SOTIF-related activities; 
x The development environment in which they have been performed. 
 
Work is ongoing to further develop the argument structure and to recommend support-
ing claims. This will include broadening the argument scope (beyond [1]) to incorporate 
causes of hazardous events relating to malfunctions (functional safety) and vulnerabil-
ities (cybersecurity). It is anticipated that this work will form a basis for a subsequent 
MISRA publication that follows on from [9]. 
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